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Abstract—In this paper we describe a novel approach to
detecting power outages that utilizes social media platform users
as “social sensors” for virtual detection of power outages. We
present the underlying methodology based on analyzing Twitter
and other social media data that detects bursts in tweets related to
the power outages. The proposed methodology was implemented
and deployed by a major company in the area of enterprise
solutions for social media aggregation for the electrical utility
industry as a part of their comprehensive social engagement
platform. It was also field tested on the Twitter users in an
industrial setting and performed well during these tests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power outages constitute a serious problem around the
world that disrupts our lives in the most unexpected ways.
In the United States alone, there were 3, 634 power outages
reported in 2014, affecting an estimated 14.2 million people
[1], and over the period of 2008-2014 the US has averaged
2, 987 outages affecting 21.6 million people per year [1].
Power outage related losses for US businesses are estimated
as being in excess of $150 billion annually [1].
To address this problem, there have been extensive resources
dedicated to detecting and reporting power outages with new
technologies, such as smart sensors, meters and distribution
devices [2]. Utilities’ Outage Management Systems (OMS)
vary in their composition of outage detection technologies.
These systems typically include both traditional and, so-called,
“smart” grid elements as means of power outage detection
in the utilities’ coverage regions. Unfortunately, the sensor
and smart grid technologies, although useful in detecting
power outages, are extremely costly when deployed at scale
across the country. Full implementation of smart technologies
is not expected until approximately 2030, with total costs
estimated at a staggering $338 to $476 billion [1]. To address
this important problem in the near term and with respect to
budgetary constraints, it is necessary to develop alternative
approaches to power outage detection, including usage of a
different class of “sensors.”
The ubiquity of smart phones and social networks has given
rise to an entirely new class of sensor: the human “social
sensor” [3]. Indeed, any individual with a networked device
and a social media account has the potential to become a
“social sensor node”. Social sensor nodes are capable of
a wide range of functions, including producing unsolicited
descriptive data about spontaneous events in real-time, acting
as two-way channels for communication and information feed-
back, and functioning either independently or as a collective
network. Social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter,
consist of tens of millions of these would-be social sensor
nodes. The Electrical Utility industry is uniquely positioned
to immediately benefit from incorporating this new class
of sensors into their existing Outage Management Systems.
The data produced by social sensor nodes can be analyzed,
modeled, and used to construct a virtual outage detection
network for power outage events. A virtual outage detection
network could function independently of, and in parallel with,
utilities’ existing Outage Management Systems.
The immense value of decentralized, crowd-sourced social
data in a crisis event was underscored in the wake of 2012’s
Hurricane Sandy. The disaster, which crippled much of the
Northeast’s electrical power grid for several weeks in 2012,
prompted the US Department of Homeland Security to declare
social media as one of the “critical components of emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery” and, furthermore, the
agency noted that Twitter’s use for reporting “issues, danger,
and power outages” was regarded by many as a “lifeline” [4].
Other government agencies, such as the US Department of
Energy (DoE) and Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) have participated in the initiatives led by The White
House to improve and standardize crisis management infor-
mation [5]. These collaborations culminated in an event titled
“The White House Innovation for Disaster Response and
Recovery Initiative Demo Day” in July of 2014 which brought
together a diverse group of “technologists, entrepreneurs, and
members of the disaster response community to showcase
tools that will make a tangible impact in the lives of survivors
of large-scale emergencies” [6]. One of the authors of this
paper was invited to attend this event alongside technologists
from enterprises such as Google and Microsoft, emergency
managers from states across the US, and representatives from
eight of the US Agencies directly involved with crisis man-
agement. The co-author’s experience served as the inspiration
for this research. Enterprises, including General Electric, have
also recognized the potential value of social media in the
area of power outage detection [7]. Electrical utilities have
taken notice as well, and they have dramatically increased their
interest and investments in social media related technologies
[2].
Twitter is one type of a social network that can particularly
be useful in power outage detection. It has approximately 63
million active users in the United States alone [8], and recent
empirical research has identified a strong correlation of geo-
tagged Tweets across the world being in close proximity to the
presence of electricity [9]. As such, the social sensor nodes
needed to construct a virtual outage detection network are
potentially already in place. Furthermore, our research has
identified that a certain percentage of these Tweeting social
sensor nodes are already actively reporting on outage events
when they occur. Thus, having social sensor nodes already in
place and actively reporting on electrical outage events, our
research investigates how the information supplied by these
Twitter users can serve as the foundation upon which this
virtual outage detection network may be built.
The value of a virtual outage detection network to an
electrical utility is twofold. First, it currently serves as a
method of choice to improve Electrical Utilities’ existing
Outage Management Systems detection capabilities prior to
full implementation of smart grid elements that are still years
away from their full deployment that is projected to be done
by utilities by 2030. Since the social sensor node information
in the form of Tweets and other social media posts are free,
the costs of implementing a virtual outage detection network
constitutes a tiny fraction of the projected $338 to $476
billion needed for the full smart grid implementation, and it
could be achieved much earlier than 2030. Furthermore, once
smart grid elements are in place, a virtual outage detection
network will continue to augment the effectiveness of the
smart grid network elements by extending the reach of the
Outage Management Systems’ detection capabilities beyond
the confines of the electrical grid to wherever social media
users are located.
Finally, virtual outage detection network can complement
or maybe even replace the traditional phone-based reporting
methods when customers call electrical utilities to inform
about power outages. In particular, the younger populations,
such as teenagers, extensively use Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat
and other social-media platforms as their primary communi-
cation tools and, therefore, virtual outage detections are the
natural method of choice for them. Also, trying to reach
utilities via phone, especially in cases of extensive power
outages, can be a daunting and a time-consuming task. In
addition, people may not always have access to the phones or
have willingness to call, and the phones may not be properly
functioning in cases of serious emergencies.
This research investigates how this new data from social
sensor nodes can be captured, analyzed, and delivered as
validated, actionable information for use by the Electrical
Utility industry’s Outage Management Systems and used to
build a virtual outage detection network. The proposed method
presented in this paper uses key textual descriptions of power
outages, filters the Tweets containing these concepts, builds
a predictive model that identifies those Tweets referring to
real power outages and detects bursts among these identified
Tweets.
This method was implemented by a major company in the
area of enterprise solutions for social media aggregation for
the electrical utility industry. It is a part of that company’s
comprehensive social engagement platform under the lead-
ership of one of the authors of this paper. It was also field
tested on the Twitter users in real industrial settings. These
test results show that, from all the power outages that our
system detected, 93.7% and 97.6% of them referred to the
real outages across the two validation mechanisms reported in
the paper. Furthermore, our system was able to detect 74.1%
and 69.8% of all the power outages mentioned in the tweets
across these two validation mechanisms. Although this number
is relatively low, it is actually a good detection result because
many of the missed power outages were described by only one
or two tweets, thus potentially producing inaccurate results.
The described system constitutes the very first power outage
detection platform based on social media networks (such as
Twitter) developed in the Electrical Utility industry. The use
of social media information for power outage detection has
created substantial excitement in the Electrical Utility industry.
For example, this technology has been highlighted by a major
electrical utility industry publication as playing an integral role
in the “next generation of outage management” [2], and it
has been regarded as a “new fascinating development” by a
principle at one of the worldwide leading companies in this
area1.
Prior work in this area focused on using Twitter and other
social media platforms for detecting earthquakes and other
types of emergency events [3], [10], [11]. In particular, [3],
developed an earthquake alert and report system that uses
Twitter data for detecting and reporting earthquakes imme-
diately after their occurrence. Similarly, [12], [13] presents
the SMART-C framework for emergency detection and alert
dissemination. Unfortunately, this framework focuses mainly
on the architectural and privacy issues and does not cover
implementation and deployment aspects in [12], [13].
In contrast to this prior work, the contributions of this
project lie in focusing on the power outage application, in
developing a novel power outage detection method, and in im-
plementing it as a part of a comprehensive social engagement
platform.
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR METHODOLOGY
The proposed methodology of power outage detection is
based on the idea of (1) identifying keywords for a particular
application, (2) detecting tweets containing these keywords
and (3) identifying bursts in the stream of these tweets. More
specifically the overall approach is presented in Figure 1 and
consists of the following steps:
1) (a) Specify the set of core key concepts K pertaining to
power outages and (b) compute its closure C.
1Since we did not have a chance to obtain the explicit permission of that
person to quote him in this paper, unfortunately, we cannot reveal his identity
here.
Fig. 1. Methodology of Power Outage Detection System.
2) Collect the tweets from the Twitter stream containing
at least one key concept from set C and store them in
database D.
3) (a) Build a predictive model that identifies if tweet x
from D posted at time t refers to a power outage that
occurred around time t in the region where tweet x
originated (as determined by the tweet location);
(b) classify the tweets from database D into Class 1
specifying those tweets that include their GPS data or
home location and that were posted by the individuals
who witnessed real power outages and immediately
tweeted about them, and all other Class 0 tweets.
4) Identify the bursts of Class 1 tweets in the stream
generated in Step 3 (that refer to currently occurring
power outages).
5) Extract the aspects of the power outages for each burst of
Class 1 tweets, these aspects pertaining to the possible
reasons and the weather conditions of the outage.
These five steps are further explained in detail in the rest
of this section.
A. Building a Set of Key Concepts
We start the process of building the key concepts pertaining
to power outages by first identifying the set of core key
concepts K, such as “power outage” and “no power.” Set K of
these core concepts is specified “by hand” (i.e., manually by
the expert on power outages). After that, we compute closure
C of this set of core concepts K by finding other concepts
that are “similar” to set K. More specifically, we proceed as
follows. For each keyword in the concept, we find it synonyms
using an online dictionary and a WordNet [14]. Then we
construct the list of combinations of synonyms of individual
words using all possible combinations of them. As a result, we
obtain complete closure of all the possible synonyms of a key
concept, although some of them may not make much sense.
For example, if we use “force” as the synonym of “power”
and “failure” as a synonym of “outage”, then “force failure” is
not really a synonym of “power outage.” Nevertheless, this is
not a problem in our case because the value of such irrelevant
key concepts will be automatically reduced in the subsequent
steps of our outage identification process (described in Section
II-C). Therefore, we do not filter such meaningless concepts
from the set C now because our main objective in this step is
to achieve maximal coverage of all the possible concepts that
may point in some way to the power outage.
In our study, we specified the following set of core
key concepts K = {“power outage, ” “no power, ”
“electric failure”}, and generated 110 key concepts as a
result of computing its closure C. Some examples of the key
concepts from this set C include “power failure,” “electricity
outages,” “electrical blackout,” “electrics out,” “no energy.”
B. Collecting Tweets
Given closure C of the set of power outage key concepts
described to Section II-A, we use Twitter API to extract from
the Twitter stream all the tweets containing at least one of the
concepts from set C. We extract such Tweets in real time and
store them in database D of all the tweets related to power
outages. In our study, we have obtained the Twitter data from
08/18/2014 to 1/25/2015 using set C of the key concepts.
As a result, we have collected 117, 490 tweets related to power
outages over the period of 5 months.
Furthermore, we have also specified 281 regions of the
United States corresponding to the regional power companies,
each region being served by that power company and con-
stituting the unit of analysis of power outages based on the
tweets posted in that region. Therefore, this partitioning of the
USA into regions allows us to identify power outages for each
power utility.
C. Predictive Model
Clearly, not all the tweets in database D identify real power
outages. For example, the following tweet “MDU Plans Power
Outages details here–>http://t.co/abcd1234” is referring to a
power outage that can possibly occur in the future and not
to a currently occurring outage. Therefore, it is necessary to
differentiate between the useful tweets and all other possible
(and irrelevant) tweets. Furthermore, several types of tweets
describe different aspects of a power outage but do not refer
to the real power outages happening at that moment, such
as tweets referring to past power outages, the tweets from
the news agencies referring to power outages that happened
in other regions, or the tweets that prepare population to
Fig. 2. Receiver Operating Characteristic curves
possible power outages that can happen in the region due to
the approaching storms or other similar reasons. In this project
we focused on the identification of the tweets that have their
GPS or home location and that were posted by the individuals
who witnessed real power outages and immediately tweeted
about them (Class 1 tweets). We define all other types of
tweets as Class 0.
To identify such tweets, we construct a predictive model
that determines if tweet x from database D posted at time
t belongs to Class 1. Such model helps us identify all the
Class 1 tweets in database D and classify the newly posted
tweets as being of Class 1 or Class 0.
In this project we build a predictive model using the
following two methods:
1) The standard method, in which we labeled a ran-
domly selected subset of tweets from D by hand, and
constructed a supervised predictive model identifying
Class 1 tweets using some of the standard machine
learning classification algorithms.
2) The active learning method, in which we constructed
a machine learning classifier having initially very few
labeled examples. Then we iteratively identified new
examples to be labeled in order to improve the prediction
quality of the model generated during the previous
iteration.
Standard Method. To follow the standard approach, we
labeled a random sample of 4, 000 tweets and divided this set
in the 80/20 proportion for the training and testing purpose.
We built our classification model using the following list of
features:
1) Features based on text of the tweet
• single words (True/False)
• n-grams of words (True/False)
• number of words in the tweet
• number of symbols in the tweet
• number of capital letters in the tweet
• if the tweet contains a URL link (True/False)
• if the tweet is a re-tweet (True/False)
• sentiment of the tweet
Fig. 3. Precision-Recall curves
• if the tweet contains numbers (True/False)
• number of verbs in the past tense
2) Features based on user name:
• length of the user name
• number of capital letters in the user name
• if the user name contains certain special words, such
as “news”, “police”, “power”, etc.
Among all these features, “single word” is a Boolean feature
specifying whether a particular word from the universe of all
the words in database D is present in the tweet. Also, the n-
gram feature specifies the same concept as the “single word”
but for the n-grams. We used n-grams with n = 2 and n = 3
in our study. The sentiment feature of the tweet identifies its
sentiment, as produced by the Python library TextBlob2.
We compared several classical machine learning methods,
including Naive Bayes (NB), Logistic Regression (LR) and
Random Forests (RF). The results of these comparisons in
terms of ROC and Precision-Recall curves are reported in
Figures 2 and 3 respectively. We built these models and did
the analysis using Python scikit-learn library [15].
As you can see in Figures 2 and 3, the performance results
for all the three methods are comparable. We selected the LR
method among the three alternatives since it is slightly better
than the other approaches.
Furthermore, as our NB and RF models showed, the most
powerful features were the features specifying the length of
the tweet, such as the number of words and symbols in the
tweet. This means that the true power outages happening in
real time are usually specified by significantly shorter tweets
(that are of Class 1) than other types of tweets related to
power outages (that are of Class 0). Also, tweets of Class 1
rarely constitute re-tweets and unlikely contain links.
Finally, the F1 − measure performance of our Logistic
Regression model on the test set is F1Class1 = 0.74 and
F1Class0 = 0.88.
Active Learning Method. In the active learning method, we
started with labeling a small set of n random tweets from our
2textblob.readthedocs.org
dataset D and built NB model using the same set of features as
for the standard method but based on only these n tweets. In
our study we started with n = 10. Further, at each iteration,
we predicted labels for all the tweets in D and selected a
new set of n tweets to be labeled next. We selected this new
set according to the method described in [16], in particular
we selected for labeling the set of unlabeled examples that
generated the lowest expected error on all other examples. We
did this process iteratively until we reached saturation. As we
ran this iterative learning process, we checked the prediction
quality of the resulting NB model on each iteration on the
test set of 800 tweets. The authors in [16] maintain that their
active learning procedure can reach sufficiently good results
within the first 30 or 40 labeled items. Our study confirmed
the same result since we reached convergence for our model
using only 30 to 40 labels. In particular, the performance on
the test set is F1Class1 = 0.697 for the NB model built on
the first 30 labeled items and F1Class1 = 0.712 for the first
40 labeled items.
Although we could have used either type of classification
model (the standard or the active one) since both of them
perform well, we used the standard LR model in our study.
This standard LR model classified all the tweets from database
D and identified 34, 436 of them as Class 1 tweets (we
denote this set as W ). Note that the tweets from database D
containing the “irrelevant key concepts” described in Section
II-A will be eliminated in this step, as being not relevant to
real power outages according to our predictive model. Next,
we use the tweets from set W for the identification of power
outages as described in Section II-D.
D. Identification of Power Outages
Having a tweet of Class 1 from set W described in Section
II-C does not necessarily mean that there is a true power
outage at the time of the tweet post since false positive rates
of these tweets can be high. Therefore, a better method of
identification of power outages is based on the analysis of the
time sequence of tweets in set W and identification of bursts
in that sequence.
Since the burst detection problem has been studied before
[17], [18], [19], we decided to apply one of the prior burst
detection methods to our problem. More specifically, we used
the particular burst detection algorithm developed by Jon
Kleinberg [18] where he considered a stream of emails and
news articles that arrive continuously over time and detected
bursts of discussion of certain topics among them using an
infinite state automaton technique, in which bursts appear
naturally as state transitions. This method is shown to be
efficient and it deals with the underlying noises, thus not
requiring usage of sliding windows or human interventions.
In our study we used Kleinberg’s method for detecting
bursts within the streams of tweets within each region by
inspecting time periods between the consecutive tweets of
Class 1 and identifying those groups of subsequent tweets
having abnormally short time periods between them. We have
also extended the method from [18] by examining all the bursts
detected by Kleinberg’s algorithm and accepting only those of
them as “true bursts” that have the number of tweets greater
than some threshold value th. The threshold number th is
selected by finding the right balance between the precision
and recall measures of the model. In our case, we selected
the threshold level of th = 2 by experimenting with different
levels. Finally, we have applied this burst detection method to
each of the 281 regions described in Section II-B in order to
detect power outages in those particular regions.
The burst detection method described in this section is
really an off-line detection method applicable to the historical
tweeting data. In contrast, we needed to detect power outages
in real time in our study. Therefore, we launch the Kleinberg’s
algorithm [18] each time we receive a Class 1 tweet t ∈ W
and check if the algorithm has detected a burst at the time
when tweet t was posted. Further, once we detect such real-
time burst, we keep track of all the Class 1 tweets from W
corresponding to this burst until it subsides according to Klein-
berg’s algorithm. We denote this set of tweets corresponding
to a particular i-th burst as Si. In our study we identified 3, 750
such bursts across 135 regions.
E. Aspect Extraction of Power Outages
In addition to detecting power outages, we also try to
identify the following two aspects of these outages: (a) its
reason, such as equipment failure or public accident, and (b)
the weather condition at the time of the outage. We accomplish
this task as follows.
Each type of reason of a power outage is defined by a set
of its characteristic keywords. In our study, we have used the
standard reasons for power outages, as adopted by a major
electrical utility company:
• Vegetation, such as a tree falling on a power line
• Equipment Failure, such as a problem with a power
substation, or a power line pole falling down
• Public Accident, such as a car accident involving power
equipment
• Wildlife, such as a squirrel cutting a power line.
Then we define a set of keywords for each of these four
categories of power outages. For example, we defined the
following set of keywords for the Vegetation category: “tree,”
“limb,” “branch,” “vines,” and “trunk.” Then our system scans
the set of tweets Si corresponding to a particular burst of
Class 1 tweets and identifies for each keyword in each of the
four categories the set of tweets in Si containing that keyword.
For example, the keyword “tree” in the Vegetation category
may have appeared in tweets t1, t5 and t9, and the keyword
“branch” may have appeared in tweets t2, t5 and t8. After that,
for each category we combine all the tweets containing at least
one of its keywords. For example, category Vegetation will
have the union of the tweets corresponding to the keywords
“branch” and “tree,” i.e., t1, t2, t5, t8 and t9.
We also use a very similar method for the weather identi-
fication process. In particular, we used the standard weather
classification codes adopted by a major electrical utility com-
pany, such as: Rain, Wind, Calm, Snow, etc. For each of
these weather conditions, we have a set of corresponding
keywords, as for the case of the power outage reasons. For
example, for the weather condition Snow we have identified
the following keywords: “snow,” “snowfall,” “ice,” “sleet,”
“drifts,” “melting,” etc. Then we proceed in the same way
as for the power outage reasons and identify the set of tweets
in Si where these keywords occur.
In conclusion, our system reports not only the occurrence
of a power outage in a certain region at a certain time, but
it also outputs all of its defining tweets Si together with the
list of power outage reasons and the weather conditions, and
the set of tweets corresponding to these reasons and weather
conditions. In Section III we evaluate the performance of our
power outage detection method described in this section.
III. RESULTS
We evaluate performance of our system based on two types
of data. First of all, we compare the tweet bursts detected by
our system with the information about real power outages,
as observed and recorded by a power company. Secondly,
we compare the power outages detected by our method with
the outages that were identified and tweeted by some of the
reliable sources, such as police departments, news agencies,
power companies, etc. We describe these two evaluations in
Sections III-A and III-B respectively.
A. Utility Power Outage Data
We have obtained information about the observed power
outages for one of the major utility companies operating in
a large municipal region in the US for the time period from
10/25/2014 to 1/25/2015. For confidentiality reasons, unfortu-
nately, we cannot reveal neither the name of the company nor
the geographical region where it operates. Therefore, we refer
to this Utility and to the region where it operates as XYZ in
this paper.
The unit of power outage for the XYZ company is the event
defined by the loss of power on a single unit of power supply,
called “feeder”. A complete power outage is a complex event
that is defined by a combination of individual power outages
on one or several feeders that occur, roughly, at the same time.
Therefore, a complete power outage consists of one or several
outage “fragments,” each fragment corresponding to a single
feeder. Each “feeder outage” event is defined by its starting
time, ending time, feederID, outage type, location, cause,
category, equipment type, the number of affected customers
and some other characteristics.
Figure 4 presents an example of the histogram of tweets
posted in the XYZ region on an hourly basis on 1/18/2015.
The blue histogram in Figure 4 shows the number of tweets
per hour containing at least one of the keywords from set
C described in Section II-A. The green line corresponds to
the histogram recording the quantities of Class 1 tweets
over time. Finally, the red line defines the number of tweets
corresponding to the detected bursts of power outage tweets.
As you can see from Figure 4, the red histogram shows that
Fig. 4. Numbers of tweets by hours in Utility XYZ region on 1/18/15
our system has detected two power outages in the XYZ region
on January 18, 2015.
We measure performance of the power outage detection
method presented in Section II using the precision and recall
measures as follows.
Precision Calculations. For each observed burst in tweets,
we identify if it has a registered power outages on at least
one feeder that match this burst by time and by location (as
defined by the same region). The precision measure is defined
as follows in this case:
Precision =
#True Positive
#True Positive+#False Positive
(1)
where #True Positive is the number of bursts that matched
at least one power outage event, and #False Positive is the
number of bursts that did not match any power outage event.
Recall Calculations. For each power outage event observed
on a feeder, we identify if it has the corresponding burst of
tweets reported at approximately the same time and the same
location (region) as the power outage. The recall measure is
defined as follows in this case:
Recall =
#True Positive
#True Positive+#False Negatives
. (2)
where #True Positive is the number of power out-
age events that matched at least one detected burst, and
#False Negative is the number of outage events that did not
match any detected power outage discussion burst on Twitter.
Although our system has identified 325 tweets posted in the
XYZ region between 10/25/2014 and 1/25/2015 that contain
the key concepts, only 163 of them were classified as Class
1 tweets. From these 163 Class 1 tweets, our system has
identified 16 bursts of outage discussions using the methods
reported in Section II-D.
The performance results are reported in Table I. As you
can see, 15 out of the total of 16 power outages identified by
our method in the Utility XYZ region between 10/25/2014
to 1/25/2015, have been confirmed by the XYZ company
data, thus producing the precision performance of 93.7%.
Furthermore, the 16th power outage not confirmed by the XYZ
data corresponded to some lights going off on certain floors of
a City hotel, as recorded by a few tweets posted by the hotel
Identified PO bursts 16
Detected PO confirmed by utilities 15
Precision 93.7%
PO in validation data 298
PO identified by system 109
PO discussed on Twitter 147
Total Recall 36.5%
Twitter based Recall 74.1%
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE RESULTS BASED ON THE UTILITY POWER OUTAGE (PO)
DATA
customers. Since this power outage was so small, it was not
detected by the XYZ company.
The recall performance measure is recorded in Table I.
Out of 298 of the total “feeder outage” events reported by
XYZ between 10/25/2014 to 1/25/2015, 109 of these events
corresponded to some bursts in the tweet discussions detected
by our system. This result corresponds to the total recall
performance measures of 36.5%.
Although such levels of recall are usually considered to be
“low” in many applications, it is, nevertheless, are “reason-
able” performance measure in our case because not all the
power outages are usually discussed on Twitter. For example,
some power outages occurring in the rural and less “social-
media friendly” regions, as well as in the more industrial (vis-
a-vis more residential) areas may not be recorded on Twitter.
To test this hypothesis, we examined how many of the 298
total power outage events have really been actually recorded
in out Twitter data. And it turned out that only 147 were
recorded. This means that our system has captured 109 out
of the total 147 recorded outages, which constitutes 74.1%
for the Twitter-based recall measure. The rest 25.9% of the
power outage events mentioned on Twitter were represented
by only 1-2 tweets and, thus, were missed by our system.
One nice property of this data and the performance measures
is that they correspond to the actual power outages. However,
this data corresponds to only one geographical region of Utility
XYZ (out of 281 regions in the US) and only to the three
months of collected data. Therefore, it is also important to test
the performance of our method on all the regions and over a
longer time period. In the next section, we present such a study
where we evaluate the performance of our system against the
power outages, as recorded by various “authoritative sources.”
B. Outage Data Based on Reliable Twitter Accounts
In this section we evaluate performance of our system vis-
a-vis power outages detected by tweets coming from various
reliable sources, such as news organizations, police depart-
ments and other “official” accounts whose job is to report the
news and different emergency events through various venues,
including Twitter. Unlike the previous case, such reports are
filed across most of the US regions, albeit covering not all
the power outages, but focusing only on the major and most
“newsworthy” ones. We construct this set of “reliable tweets”
as follows:
1) We, first, identify the set of reliable Twitter user
names, such as “NBCNews,” “NantucketPolice,” “Edi-
son Electric,” etc. We constructed this set based on the
list of “reliable” keywords, such as “news”, “police”,
“power”, “electricity”, “weather”, “alert,” etc., and col-
lected all the user names from the database D containing
these keywords as their substrings.
2) For the set of reliable user names identified in Step 1,
we collect all the tweets from database D that these
users have generated. We assume that the tweets in the
resulting set R are all “true,” i.e., are reliable in the
sense that the power outages mentioned in them indeed
happened in real life. For example, if ABCNews posted
a tweet about a power outage in a region, we trust that
power outage indeed happened in accordance with the
ABCNews tweet.
We next use this generated set R to calculate the precision
and recall measures as follows.
Precision Calculations. For each identified burst of tweets
(corresponding to a power outage in a certain region), we
collect a set of tweets from set R posted around the time of this
burst. In our study, we assumed “around” to be one day before
and one days after the burst. Further, we manually examine the
identified bursts and label them as: (a) “news” if the burst is
confirmed as an outage by one of our reliable users, such as a
news agency or a police department; (b) “manual” if the burst
is not confirmed by any of our reliable users, but a sufficient
number of tweets corresponding to this burst describes a power
outage, and they were posted within a small geographic area
and a short time period; (c) “false” if the burst doesn’t relate
to a real power outage, i.e., the set of tweets corresponding
to the burst are not really about the currently occurring power
outage.
For the proposed method, we compute two precision mea-
sures, Precisionnews and Precisionmanual based on the pre-
viously generated labels using formula (1). When calculating
Precisionnews, by True Positive we assume the set of
bursts detected by our system and confirmed by the reliable
sources, such as news agencies, and, therefore, they are labeled
as “news”. For the Precisionmanual case, by True Positive
we assume all the detected bursts that are confirmed by
either the reliable sources or have been confirmed by manual
inspection and, therefore, labeled as “news” or “manual”.
The number of (#True Positive + #False Positive) in
the denominator is the same in both cases and is equal to the
total number of all the bursts detected by our system.
Recall Calculations. The recall measure in our case is the
ratio of all the power outages identified by our system and
the total number of power outages reported by the reliable
sources. In order to compute the recall measure, we aggregate
all the tweets from set R posted in the same region per day.
For each (region, day) pair containing at least one tweet from
set R we collect: (a) all the tweets posted in this region two
days prior and two days after the specified day; (b) all the
bursts identified in this region within the same time interval
as in (a). Further, we manually examine all the (region, day)
Identified PO bursts 3750
Detected PO confirmed by utilities 152 (from 300)
Detected PO confirmed by inspection 296 (from 300)
Precision 54.7%
Precision Manual 97.6%
PO in validation data 4205
PO identified by system 169 (from 300)
PO discussed on Twitter 242 (from 300)
Total Recall 56.3%
Twitter based Recall 69.8%
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE RESULTS BASED ON RELIABLE TWITTER ACCOUNTS
pairs and label them as: (a) “identified” if the power outage
discussed by one of the reliable users was also identified by our
system; (b) “missing” if our system did not identify the power
outage while some tweets did; further, we collect the number
of tweets referring to this power outage; (c) “no data” if our
system missed the power outage and there were no tweets
posted by the individual users about this power outage.
We also compute the recall measure in the standard way
using (2) but in two different “flavors,” Recallcomplete and
Recalldata. For the Recallcomplete measure, we assume that
False Negative is the total number of power outages men-
tioned on Twitter by reliable sources that were missed by our
system. These power outages were labeled as either “missing”
or “no data”. For the Recalldata measure, we assume that
#False Negative is the number of power outages that were
mentioned on Twitter not only by the reliable sources but also
by individual users, and that were missed by our system. These
power outages were labeled as “missing”. In both cases, by
True Positive we assume the set of real power outages that
were mentioned in tweets from the reliable sources and were
identified by our system. These power outages were labeled as
“identified”. Note that the size of this set is equal to the size
of the set used in calculating the precision measure above (i.e.,
the number of bursts detected by our system and confirmed
by the reliable sources) since both of these two sets refer to
the same thing.
The performance results are reported in Table II. In our
study, we have identified 3, 750 tweeting bursts over the time
period from 08/18/2014 to 1/25/2015 (5 months in total).
When we labeled 300 of these bursts using the techniques
described above, we produced 152 “news,” 144 “manual”
and 4 “false” labels. Based on these numbers, the precision
performance measures are: Precisionnews = 0.506 and
Precisionmanual = 0.976. When computing the recall mea-
sures over the time period of five months, we, first, obtained
4, 205 (region, day) pairs containing news about power out-
ages. Then we determined the labels for 300 of these pairs and
obtained 169 “identified”, 73 “missed” and 58 “no data” labels.
Based on these numbers, the recall performance measures are:
Recallcomplete = 0.563 and Recalldata = 0.698. Further,
although, the Recalldata measure is only 0.698 in our case, the
average number of tweets posted by the individual users about
power outages that our system missed is equal to 1.82. This
means that our system missed mostly those power outages that
are mentioned in only less than two tweets on average and,
therefore, are really hard to detect.
Finally, our system has detected possible reason of power
outage in 201 cases of twitter bursts (out of the total of 3, 750
bursts). Also, it has detected the discussed weather conditions
in 387 twitter bursts (out of the total of 3, 750 bursts). These
numbers mean that in certain cases, people not only report
about actual power outages but also provide the reasons for
and the weather conditions during these outages.
Note that we haven’t compared our system with any base-
lines. This is the case because it is the very first system for
detecting power outages using Twitter data and, therefore,
there is no other similar system with which it can be compared.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a novel power outage detection
method that we have developed as a part of a comprehensive
social engagement platform deployed by a major company in
the area of enterprise solutions for social media aggregation for
the electrical utility industry. The proposed method presented
in this paper uses certain predefined key concepts as textual
descriptions of power outages, filters the tweets containing
these concepts, builds a predictive model that identifies those
tweets referring to real power outages, and detects bursts
among these identified tweets. These bursts are subsequently
tested to see if they really correspond to actual power outages.
The detected power outages are reported to the users together
with the possible reasons of the outage and the weather
conditions in the region at that time.
The proposed method was implemented in our system,
tested on the Twitter users, and validated on the power outage
data provided by the Utility XYZ from Large Municipality
and on the power outage data reported by the news media,
police departments and other similar types of outage sources
(that we call collectively as “reliable sources”). The validation
results show that the precision of our method constitute 93.7%
for the XYZ case. For the “reliable sources” case, 54.7% of
the detected power outages were confirmed by at least one
of these reliable sources. Furthermore, 97.6% of the detected
power outages were identified manually as real power outages.
Out of all the power outages identified by the XYZ com-
pany, we managed to discover 36.5% of them using our
system, giving us the recall value of 36.5%. Furthermore, we
managed to identify 74.1% of all the power outages discussed
on Twitter in the XYZ region during the 3-month time period.
Finally, our system has identified 56.3% of all the power
outages reported by the “reliable sources” between 8/18/2014
and 1/25/2015, and has also identified 69.8% of the power
outages discussed on Twitter by individual users.
Although some of these performance measure results can be
viewed as “low” in other data mining applications that enjoy
higher levels of precision and recall, we maintain that these
results are very good in our power outage virtual detection
application for the following reasons. First, news media, police
departments and other “reliable sources” discuss only major
power outages in the social media, whereas many Class 1
tweets refer to smaller types of outages, such as lights going
off on certain floors of a hotel. This necessarily brings the
precision levels down (such as the 54.7% number) for the
“reliable sources” case in our study. Similarly, not all the
power outages are being discussed on Twitter. For example,
those in the rural and in the less “social-media-friendly”
regions may not be captured by tweets. This means that the
recall levels are expected to be low in our application, as the
numbers of 36.5% and 56.3% demonstrate this. Furthermore,
among the power outages that were mentioned by individual
users but missed by our system (i.e., 74.1% and 69.8% of them
across the two validation mechanisms), an average size of the
tweet reference corresponding to those outages was only 1.82
tweets. This means that those outages missed by our system
were not significant in terms of the tweeting activities and
therefore hardly detectable.
Finally, our system identified a possible reason of power
outage in 5.36% of the detected cases, and identified the
weather condition in the region at that time in 10.32% of the
detected cases. These low numbers are primarily due to the
fact that most of the tweets simply state the fact of a power
outage and do not report any reasons of why it happened.
As explained in Section I, our system was favorably received
by some of the key Electric Utility industry players, who
have recognized its role in the future of Outage Management
Systems [2] and regarded it as a “new fascinating devel-
opment” in the industry (see footnote 1). Furthermore, the
continued collaboration by one of this paper’s co-authors with
the US Department of Energy as part of The White House
Innovation for Disaster Response and Recovery Initiative
Demo Day initiative should ensure this type of technology is
afforded the opportunity for significant exposure to numerous
US Government Agencies, emergency mangers, and leading
technology firms. The prospect of constructing a validated,
effective virtual outage detection network at a tiny fraction of
the cost of full implementation of the smart grid (with high-
end projected costs approaching half a trillion dollars over the
next 15 years) solidifies the business case for this technology.
As a part of future work, we plan to adopt our system
to other types of power outages and beyond, such as com-
putational advertising, mass transit applications and political
campaigns. In addition, although the focus of this work was
on the detection of power outages, the proposed method can
be extended to other types of outages, such as water, gas,
cable and Internet outages. To apply our method to these
other types of outages, one should specify a new list of key
concepts corresponding to these outages (in Step 1 of Figure
1), as opposed to power outages. Once it is done, all other
steps in Figure 1 can be implemented in a somewhat similar
fashion. Moreover, the predictive modeling Step 3(a) can and
should be done using the active learning approach since, as
our study showed, we can build a good predictive model with
only 40 learning examples (as opposed to 4, 000 examples, as
was reported in Section II-C). Finally, the aspects of these new
types of outages will be different from our case, and therefore
Step 5 in Figure 1 needs to be adjusted to the new application.
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